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Recent financial regulatory reforms target banks’ risk-taking behaviours 
without considering their ownership and governance. This chapter 
argues that bank governance influences how regulations alter bank’s 
incentives. Banks with more powerful owners tend to take more risks, 
and greater capital requirements actually increase risk-taking in banks 
with powerful shareholders. Bank regulation should condition on bank 
governance. 
 
Regulations for banks are being rewritten in response to the global 
financial crisis. The Basel III framework is being adopted, capital 
requirements are being increased, and safety nets have expanded in 
scope and size, all with the aim of making banks safer. These financial 
reforms and re-regulations, however, ignore bank governance – the 
ownership of banks and the incentives and conflicts that arise between 
bank owners and managers. But what if the governance structure of 
banks is intrinsically linked to bank risk? And what if bank governance 
interacts with regulation to shape bank stability? 
This emphasis on using official regulations to induce sound banking 
while ignoring the role of bank governance is surprising because 
standard agency theories suggest that ownership structure influences 
corporate risk-taking (Jensen and Meckling 1976). This gap is also 
potentially serious from a policy perspective. The same regulations 
could have different effects on bank risk-taking depending on the 
comparative power of shareholders within the ownership structure of 
each bank. Changes in policies toward bank ownership, such as allowing 
private equity groups to invest in banks or changing limits on ownership 
concentration, could have very different effects on bank stability 
depending on other bank regulations. 
Yet research on bank risk-taking typically does not incorporate 
information on each bank’s ownership structure. In an exception, 
Saunders et al (1990) find that owner-controlled banks exhibit higher 
risk-taking behaviour than banks controlled by managers with small 
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shareholdings. They do not, however, analyse whether ownership 
structure and regulations jointly shape bank risk-taking, or whether 
their results generalise beyond the United States to countries with 
distinct laws and regulations. 
Banks naturally take more risk than is optimal for society because their 
shareholders are subject to limited liability. As in any limited liability 
firm, diversified owners have incentives to increase bank risk after 
collecting funds from bondholders and depositors (Galai and Masulis 
1976). However, the ability of bank shareholders to maximise their 
equity value by increasing risk depends in part on the preferences of the 
bank’s managers and on the constraints imposed on bank risk-taking by 
bank regulation and the regulators that enforce such regulation (Buser 
et al 1981). 
The risk-taking incentives of bank managers will depend on the degree 
to which their interests are linked to those of value-maximising 
stockholders. Managers with bank-specific human capital skills and 
private benefits of control tend to advocate less risk-taking than 
stockholders without those skills and benefits (Jensen and Meckling 
1976, Demsetz and Lehn 1985, John et al 2008). From this perspective, 
banks with an ownership structure that empowers diversified owners 
take on more risk than banks with owners who play a more subdued 
governance role. Of course, to the extent that the manager has a large 
equity stake in the bank or holds stock options, this would enhance his 
or her risk-taking incentives by enticing them with potentially large 
rewards for high-return investments. In practice, however, bank 
managers often do not hold much bank stock, placing them at odds with 
diversified bank owners in their views on risk-taking. 
To complicate matters further, the effectiveness of bank regulation to 
curtail bank risk-taking will also depend on the incentives of the bank 
regulators that enforce such regulations. With self-interested bank 
regulators that have private benefits or concerns (such as reputational 
concerns from intervening in banks) or can be captured by industry, 
regulation to constrain bank risk-taking may be muted. 
Theory also predicts that regulations influence the risk-taking incentives 
of diversified owners differently from those of debt holders and non-
shareholder managers. For example, deposit insurance intensifies the 
ability and incentives of stockholders to increase risk (Merton 1977, 
Keeley 1990). The impetus for greater risk-taking generated by deposit 
insurance operates on owners, not necessarily on non-shareholder 
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managers. As a second example, consider capital regulations. One goal 
of capital regulations is to reduce the risk-taking incentives of owners 
by forcing owners to place more of their personal wealth at risk in the 
bank (Kim and Santomero 1994). Capital regulations need not reduce 
the risk-taking incentives of influential owners, however. Specifically, 
although capital regulations might induce the bank to raise capital, they 
might not force influential owners to invest more of their wealth in the 
bank. Furthermore, capital regulations might increase risk-taking. 
Owners might compensate for the loss of utility from more stringent 
capital requirements by selecting a riskier investment portfolio (Gale 
2010), intensifying conflicts between owners and managers over bank 
risk-taking. As a final example, many countries attempt to reduce bank 
risk by restricting banks from engaging in non-lending activities, such 
as securities and insurance underwriting. As with capital requirements, 
however, these activity restrictions could reduce the utility of owning a 
bank, intensifying the risk-taking incentives of owners relative to 
managers. Thus, the impact of regulations on risk depends on the 
comparative influence of owners within the governance structure of 
each bank. 
While banking theory suggests that bank regulations affect the risk-
taking incentives of owners differently from those of managers, 
corporate governance theory suggests that ownership structure affects 
the ability of owners to influence risk. As argued by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986), shareholders with larger voting and cash-flow rights have 
correspondingly greater power and incentives to shape corporate 
behaviour than smaller owners. From this perspective, ownership 
structure influences the ability of owners to alter bank risk in response 
both to standard risk-shifting incentives and to incentives created by 
official regulations. 
Taken together, these theories predict that diversified owners have 
stronger incentives to increase risk than non-shareholder managers, so 
banks with powerful, diversified owners tend to be riskier than widely 
held banks, holding other factors constant. They also predict that bank 
regulations affect the risk-taking incentives of owners differently from 
managers, so the actual impact of regulations on risk-taking depends on 
the comparative power of shareholders relative to managers within each 
bank’s corporate governance structure. 
In a recent paper (Laeven and Levine 2009), we make a first attempt to 
test how national regulations interact with a bank’s private governance 
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structure to determine its risk-taking behaviour. We find that banks 
with more powerful owners (as measured by the size of their 
shareholdings) tend to take greater risks. This supports arguments 
predicting that equity holders have stronger incentives to increase risk 
than non-shareholding managers and debt holders, and that owners 
with substantial cash flows have the power and incentives to induce the 
bank’s managers to increase risk-taking. 
Furthermore, the impact of bank regulations on bank risk depends 
critically on each bank’s ownership structure such that the relation 
between regulation and bank risk can change sign depending on 
ownership structure. For example, the results suggest that deposit 
insurance is only associated with an increase in risk when the bank has 
a large equity holder with sufficient power to act on the additional risk-
taking incentives created by deposit insurance. The data also suggest 
that owners seek to compensate for the loss in value of owning a bank 
from capital regulations by increasing bank risk. Stricter capital 
regulations are associated with greater risk when the bank has a 
sufficiently powerful owner, but stricter capital regulations have the 
opposite effect in widely held banks. Ignoring bank governance leads to 
incomplete and sometimes erroneous conclusions about the impact of 
bank regulations on bank risk-taking. 
These findings have important policy implications. They question the 
current approach to bank supervision and regulation that relies on 
internationally established capital regulations and supervisory practices. 
Instead, private governance mechanisms exert a powerful influence 
over bank risking and the same official regulation has different effects 
on bank risk-taking depending on the bank’s governance structure. 
Since governance structures differ systematically across countries, bank 
regulations must be custom-designed and adapted as financial 
governance systems evolve. Regulations should be geared toward 
creating sound incentives for owners, managers, and debt holders, not 
toward harmonising national regulations across economies with very 
different governance structures. 
Naturally, regulations will shape the future of banking. It is not too late 
for bank regulation to condition on bank governance, and for 
supervision with limited resources to make the enforcement of 
regulation a function of a bank’s governance structure. For example, 
supervisors could allocate a disproportionate amount of their resources 
to supervising those banks that corporate governance theory would 
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indicate are intrinsically more inclined to take risk, such as owner-
controlled banks and/or banks with concentrated ownership. More 
generally, the risk-taking of banks will depend on the underlying 
incentives and preferences of the banks managers and owners, including 
their ownership and wealth concentration in the bank. 
Finally, it is important to recognise that the risk-shifting incentives of 
banks arising from limited liability would be significantly reduced if bank 
owners would be subject to extended liability – for example, through 
double liability which holds each shareholder liable to the amount of the 
par value of the shares held by him, in addition to the amount invested 
in such shares (Esty 1998). While holding shareholders liable for a 
portion of the bank’s debts after insolvency would significantly increase 
the cost of capital and therefore reduce the lending capacity of banks 
with potentially negative ramifications for growth, it would create safer 
banks and therefore should not easily be discarded as a policy option to 
enhance financial stability. 
Disclaimer: While the author of this chapter is a staff member of the 
International Monetary Fund, the views expressed herein are those of 
the author and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, 
or its management. 
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